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This paper analyzes a social security policy with public debt in an overlapping generations growth
model. In particular, the paper considers a situation in which population aging causes a heavy burden
of social security payments where public debt is issued by the government to ﬁnance the payment.
In the model presented below, an economy with an aging population may achieve two dynamically
ineﬃcient equilibria. Under certain conditions, the eﬀects of pension reform and population aging on
capital accumulation are entirely diﬀerent between the two equilibria.
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This paper develops an overlapping generations model of growth and aging according to the
model suggested by Pecchenino and Pollard (1997), and then uses this framework to analyze the
economic impact of social security ﬁnanced by public debt. The situation considered here is that
an aging population leads to a heavy burden of public pension payments, where social security
tax alone would not be suﬃcient to fully ﬁnance such payments. Public debt is introduced in
order to supplement this balance, and its eﬀects on capital accumulation and dynamic eﬃciency
are considered. Furthermore, the economic impact of social security reform and population aging
will also be examined.
The present analysis is motivated by two important issues in Japan, namely, population aging
and government budget deﬁcits. Since the Japanese public pension scheme is based on a pay-as-
you-go scheme, population aging leads to a greater burden of social security payments on younger
members of society.1 In addition, since the payments are partly funded by the state budget,
government deﬁcits and social security ﬁnance are closely related to each other. Therefore, this
paper implements the analysis of social security and government deﬁcits (i.e., public debt) in an
economic environment that includes population aging.
The present analysis is also motivated by a proposal suggested by several Japanese economists,
namely, a shift from a pay-as-you-go scheme to an actuarially fair pension scheme in preparation
for the eﬀects of population aging (see, for example, Hatta and Oguchi (1992)). Such a reform
might be capable of solving the problem of increasing social security payments, but it causes
yet another problem: who bears the burden of the social security payments owed to an existing
older generation? If the economy introduces an actuarially fair pension scheme to a currently
1 The Japanese public pension system originally started as an actuarially fair scheme. However, the payments
to older people has been largely ﬁnanced by social security tax revenue from the younger generation. The system
is therefore approximately the same as a pay-as-you-go scheme.
1younger generations and to all subsequent generations, the currently older generation cannot
receive payments from the currently younger generation. In order to solve this new problem,
many economists in Japan have proposed that the payments to the currently older generation
should be ﬁnanced by public debt. This paper considers the eﬀectiveness of this policy in terms
of dynamic eﬃciency.
Several studies have analyzed public pension and population aging in economic growth models
(e.g., Meijdam and Verbon (1997), Pecchenino and Pollard (1997), Pecchenino and Utendorf
(1999), and Futagami and Nakajima (2001)2 ). However, these studies do not consider a social
security policy together with public debt. Gertler (1997), who modiﬁed the Blanchard (1985) and
Weil (1989) framework in order to allow life-cycle behavior, analyzed social security as ﬁnanced
by public debt. However, his study assumed a perfect annuity market, and the analysis was
therefore unable to capture the economic impact of a pension reform toward an actuarially fair
scheme.
This paper attempts to analyze social security policy with public debt under conditions of
imperfect annuity, a topic which has not been fully addressed in previous studies but nevertheless
is more likely to reﬂect the real world. The present paper utilizes the model of Pecchenino and
Pollard (1997), and introduce public debt into their model. The present paper considers pension
reform and shows its eﬀects on capital accumulation and dynamic eﬃciency in equilibrium. The
present analysis would therefore aid policy-makers in Japan as well as those in industrialized
countries who are running budget deﬁcits against the background of a heavy burden of social
security payments caused by an aging population.
The main ﬁndings of the present analysis are as follows. First, when an economy with an
2 They analyzed the economic eﬀects of demographic structure in the presence of a social security system. In
contrast, Bental (1989), Raut (1992), Cigno (1993), Zhang and Nishimura (1993), Zhang (1995), and Zhang and
Zhang (1995) examined the impact of social security on fertility rate. The present paper focuses on the former
eﬀect, and we assume that fertility rate is an exogenous parameter.
2aging population is heavily burdened with social security payments and the government issues
public debt to ﬁnance payments, the economy experiences a dynamically ineﬃcient equilibrium
characterized by excessive savings, i.e., overaccumulation of capital. In particular, there may be
two dynamically ineﬃcient steady state equilibria: one is a saddle with a lower stock of capital,
and the other is a sink with a higher stock of capital. The former is relatively eﬃcient compared
to the latter, but the economy would converge to the latter under most initial conditions. Second,
comparative statics analyses depend heavily on whether the economy attains the former or the
latter equilibrium. Under certain conditions, the eﬀects of pension reform and population aging
on economic growth are entirely diﬀerent between the two equilibria.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 develops the model. Section 3 characterizes
social optimum. Section 4 characterizes a competitive equilibrium and analyzes the existence,
uniqueness, and stability of that equilibrium. Section 5 undertakes a comparative statics analysis.
Section 6 weighs the consequences of a social security policy under an alternative assumption.
Section 7 discusses the implications of a social security policy with public debt in an aging
economy.
2 The Model
The present model is based on that developed by Pecchenino and Pollard (1997). Consider
an inﬁnite-horizon economy composed of identical agents, perfectly competitive ﬁrms, annuity
markets, and a government. A new generation, called generation t, is born in each period
t =1 ,2,3,.... Generation t is composed of a continuum of Nt > 0 units of identical agents.
Assuming that Nt =( 1+n)Nt−1 : the net rate of population growth is n>−1.
Agents in this economy are non-altruistic: the old do not care for the young and the young
do not care for the old. Agents live at a maximum of two periods, youth and old age. An agent
3dies at the beginning of old age with a probability of 1 − p and lives throughout old age with
a probability of p ∈ (0,1]. If an agent dies young, his annuitized wealth is transferred to the
agents who live throughout old age, and his unannuitized wealth is bequeathed to his children
as unintentional bequests.
In youth, each agent is endowed with one unit of labor, which is supplied inelastically to
ﬁrms, and each agent obtains wages. An agent in generation t divides his wage wt between his
own current consumption c1
t, saving (held either as an annuity, as direct holdings of capital and
public debt, or both) for consumption in old age st, and the payment of social security taxes
quoted as a proportion of his wage τwwt; τw is the rate of social security tax levied on wage
income. Thus, the budget constraint for a young agent in generation t is:
c
1
t + st =( 1− τ
w)wt + It, (1)
where It is the per capita bequest from generation t − 1 to generation t.
In old age, agents supply their savings inelastically to ﬁrms and consume the return and
their social security beneﬁts. Actuarially fair annuity contracts are assumed to be unavailable in
the private market. The government overcomes this market failure by establishing a market in
actuarially fair annuity contracts, whereby it can control access in the following way: each agent
may place up to a ratio of γ ∈ [0,1] of his total savings in an annuity.3
The budget constraint for generation t in old age is:
c
2
t+1 =( 1+rt+1 + αt+1)st + τ
l, (2)
where c2
t+1 is consumption in old age and τl is social security beneﬁts.4 The return on savings
3 This is a voluntary plan accroding to Pecchenino and Pollard (1997). They also have considered another
plan, i.e., a mandatory plan in which each agent must place a part of his ﬁxed amount of income in an annuity.
This paper adopts only the voluntary plan and clariﬁes the diﬀerence between a perfect annuity (γ = 1) and an
imperfect annuity (γ<1).
4 In the real world, there are two forms of social security payments. One is a lump sum transfer and the other
4in (2) is stated as the sum of the return of direct holdings of capital, 1 + rt+1, and the excess
return, prorated over all savings, of holding a ratio, γ, of savings as an annuity, αt+1. Agents
without bequest motives would prefer to annuitize all their wealth to the level just under the
legal restriction.
If an agent dies young, then the unannuitized portion of his wealth,
Nt+1It+1 = Nt(1 − γ)(1 − p)(1 + rt+1)st, (3)
is distributed to his heirs, where (1 − γ) is the ratio of wealth not annuitized. The annuitized
portion is distributed among the other holders of annuities:
pαt+1st = γ(1 − p)(1 + rt+1)st. (4)
Under budget constraints (1) and (2), the utility maximization problem of an agent in gener-
ation t is to maximize lnc1
t + plnc2
t+1 subject to budget constraints (1) and (2), where wt,r t+1,







(1 + p)(1 + rt+1 + αt+1)
. (5)
This saving function states that a higher level of wage or bequest implies higher savings,
whereas a higher level of social security beneﬁts implies lower savings. A higher rate of interest
leads to a lower value of social security beneﬁts evaluated in youth, thus enhancing savings.5
The government in this particular economy can impose a social security tax, τw, on wages.
Moreover, it can issue public debt with a one-period maturity in order to ﬁnance social security
payments. The government funds the expenditure of social security and the repayment of the
is a transfer based on a replacement rate on wages. Following Pecchenino and Pollard (1997), this paper adopts
the former scheme in order to simplify the analysis. Section 6 brieﬂy considers an economy operating with the
latter form of payments.
5 It should be noted that the saving function (5) is the outcome of a partial equilibrium. Thus, the eﬀects of
wage, social security beneﬁts, and interest rate on saving, found in (5), are not necessarily observed in a general
equilibrium.
5debt with tax receipts and with the revenue from the newly issued debt. Thus, the government
budget constraint in period t is Bt+1+Ntτwwt = RtBt+pNt−1τl, where Bt is the value of public
debt maturing during period t, and Rt is the gross rate of return. As regards the left-hand
side of the above constraint, Bt+1 is the revenue from debt issue, while Ntτwwt is the revenue
from social security tax. As regards the right-hand side, RtBt is the repayment of debt, whereas
pNt−1τl represents the social security payments. Dividing both sides by Nt leads to the following
equation:
(1 + n)bt+1 + τ





where bt ≡ Bt/Nt is public debt per worker in period t. If τwwt <p τ l/(1+n), then the economy
experiences an excess burden of social security payments; that is, the social security payments
are not fully ﬁnanced by the social security tax revenues. The government therefore supplements
this balance by issuing public debt.
Firms are considered as perfectly competitive proﬁt maximizers that produce output using
the standard neoclassical production function Yt = F(Kt,L t), where Yt is aggregate output, Kt
is aggregate capital, and Lt is aggregate labor.6 The production function can be rewritten in an
intensive form as yt = f(kt), where kt ≡ Kt/Lt is a per capita capital stock in period t. Capital
depreciates at the rate of δ ∈ [0,1]. We assume the following with respect to the intensive form
of the production function, which holds in the case of the Cobb=Douglas functions.7
Assumption 1: The intensive form of the production function f(·): + →  + is continuous,
strictly increasing and strictly concave on  + and twice continuously diﬀerentiable on  ++
with the following constraints:
6 Lt = Nt for all t because of the inelastic labor supply of young agents.
7 Contrary to Pecchenino and Pollard (1997) who assumed the production function with external eﬀects of
aggregate capital ` a la Romer (1986), the present paper adopts a standard neoclassical production function. This
is because the golden rule (deﬁned in Section 3) is used as a measure of dynamic eﬃciency.
6(i) f(0) = 0,limk→0 f (k)=∞, and limk→∞f (k)=0 ;
(ii) f (k)k is increasing in k.




wt = f(kt) − ktf (kt) ≡ w(kt),
ρt = f (kt) ≡ ρ(kt),
(7)
where ρt is the rental price of capital in period t. Due to the assumed condition of perfect
competition, these conditions imply factor markets clearing.
A market clearing condition for capital is Kt+1 + Bt+1 = Ntst, which expresses the equality
of the total savings by young agents in generation t, Ntst, to the sum of the stocks of aggregate
physical capital and aggregate public debt. Dividing both sides by Nt leads to
(1 + n)(kt+1 + bt+1)=st. (8)
Since the market for capital is competitive, the following arbitrage condition holds:
Rt+1 ≡ 1+rt+1 =1− δ + ρt+1. (9)
In period 1, there are both young agents in generation 1 and initial old agents in generation
0. Each agent in generation 0 is endowed with k1 units of capital, earns the return (1+r1+α1)k1,
and consumes it. The measure of the initial old agents is pN0 > 0. The utility of an agent in
generation 0 is lnc2
1.
3 Social Optimum
Before analyzing the laissez-faire behavior of agents and ﬁrms, we focus our attention on socially






















which treats agents in an identical manner irrespective of the generation to which they belong.
The only exception is the special generation 0, which receives special treatment in matrix C.
The top row, c2
1, is the consumption by generation 0; the middle row, c1, is the consumption by
generation t ≥ 1 in youth; and the bottom row, c2, is the consumption by generation t ≥ 1i n
old age.
Deﬁnition 1: A feasible quasi-stationary allocation is the social optimum if (i) it treats identical
agents in the same way; (ii) there is no other feasible quasi-stationary allocation that
improves the economic status of at least one agent without reducing the status of any
other agent.
Socially optimal allocations maximize the social welfare function λplnc2
1+lnc1+plnc2, which











1 +( 1+n)k = f(k)+( 1− δ)k,
where λ>0 is the relative weight given to generation 0. The ﬁrst equation is the resource
constraint in period 1, and the second equation is the resource constraint in period t ≥ 2.
Solving this problem leads to the following equation:
1 − δ + f
 (k) ≥ 1+n,
with equality maintained as long as generation 0 carries no weight in the social welfare function.
The outcome, k∗, equalizes the net marginal product of capital to the growth rate, f (k∗)=δ+n.
8Following the conventional terminology, we refer to k∗ as the golden rule. If the steady state
level of capital k satisﬁes k<(>)k∗, then the economy is dynamically eﬃcient (ineﬃcient). The
analysis below uses the golden rule to judge the eﬃciency of equilibrium.
4 Competitive Equilibrium





t=1, and a sequence of capital stock {kt}∞
t=1 and public debt {bt}∞
t=1
with the initial condition (k1,b 1) and exogenous parameters {p,n,τw,τl}, such that given
these prices and allocations, an agent’s utility is maximized, ﬁrms’ proﬁts are maximized,
the government budget constraint is satisﬁed, and markets clear.
This section characterizes the competitive equilibrium allocation of capital and debt {kt,b t}.
Then, it examines the existence of the equilibrium and its dynamic eﬃciency. Finally, the
stability of the equilibrium is considered.
4.1 Characterization of the Competitive Equilibrium
Summarizing (1) - (9), the competitive equilibrium is fully characterized by a sequence {kt,b t}∞
t=1
with the initial condition (k1,b 1), such that the sequence satisﬁes the following two equations:



















Eq. (10) is derived from the saving function (5) and the market clearing condition for capital
(8). Eq. (11) is a rewrite of the government budget constraint. Substitution of bt+1 from (11) to
9(10) leads to the following equation:






















Eqs. (11) and (12) constitute a planar system of (k,b).
We proceed with our analysis of the equilibrium using a phase diagram. We initially draw
the phase diagram by which (12) yields the following equation:
kt+1   kt ⇔ bt   G(kt) ≡
p





















Figure 1 depicts the graph of G(·) and the motion of k.8
We can now draw the phase diagram by which (11) yields
bt+1   bt ⇔ bt ≷ H(kt) ≡
p
1+nτl−τww(kt)
1+n−R(kt) if kt ≶ k∗, (13)
where k∗ = k∗(δ,n), i.e., the golden rule: f (k∗)=δ + n (see previous section). Moreover,
k∗∗ = k∗∗(p,n,τl,τw), which is deﬁned as pτl/(1+n)=τww(k∗∗).9 If k = k∗∗, then H(k)=b =0
holds true. The phase diagrams are depicted in Figure 2. In particular, Figure 2a (2b) shows
the case of k∗ < (>)k∗∗.
Whether k∗ is greater than or less than k∗∗ depends on parameters p, τl,τ w, and n. The
inequality k∗ < (>)k∗∗ holds if the economy has higher (lower) p and τl and a lower (higher) τw.
8 Figure 1 is a rough sketch of the function G(·). In Subsection 4.2, the property of G(·) is deﬁned in order to
show the existence of the equilibrium.
9 The notation k∗(δ,n) implies that k∗ depends on parameters δ and n, whereas k∗∗(p,n,τl,τw) indicates that
k∗∗ depends on p,n,τl, and τw.
10In other words, k∗ < (>)k∗∗ holds if the economy has higher (lower) longevity, a larger (smaller)
amount of per capita social security payments, and a lower (higher) rate of social security tax. If
k∗ <k ∗∗ holds, the economy is faced with both an aging population and a heavy social security
burden. As regards the rate of population growth, a higher n implies a lower k∗ and k∗∗;i ti s
generally undetermined how the population growth rate n aﬀects the relation between k∗ and
k∗∗.
4.2 Existence of the Steady State Equilibrium
A steady state equilibrium is a sequence {k,b} that is stationary along the competitive equilib-
rium. This subsection examines the existence, uniqueness, and eﬃciency of the nontrivial steady
state equilibrium. The uniqueness and eﬃciency may depend on the inequality k∗   k∗∗. We
therefore will examine each case in turn.
Case I: k∗ <k ∗∗
This is the case wherein the economy has a higher p and τl and a lower τw. The economy
experiences an aging population and carries a heavy social security burden. We will initially focus
on the steady state in which the government sells bonds (b>0) or in which budget constraints
are balanced in each period (b = 0). We then consider the steady state in which the government
buy bonds (b<0).
Proposition 1:
(i) There may be two dynamically ineﬃcient steady state equilibria with (k,b)   0, if
G(k∗∗) < 0.
(ii) There is at least one dynamically ineﬃcient steady state equilibrium with (k,b)   0,
if G(k∗∗) > 0.
(iii) There is a dynamically ineﬃcient steady state equilibrium with (k,b)=( k∗∗,0), if
11G(k∗∗)=0 . In addition, there is a dynamically ineﬃcient steady state equilibrium with
(k,b)   0, if G (k∗∗) <H  (k∗∗).
Proof: As depicted in Figures 3a - 3d, H(·) ≥ 0 holds for k ∈ (k∗,k ∗∗]. If there is a steady
state equilibrium with b ≥ 0, the capital stock for this equilibrium is in the interval (k∗,k ∗∗].
Therefore, the steady state with b ≥ 0, if it exists, is dynamically ineﬃcient.
The function H(·) tends to be the vertical asymptote k = k∗ as k → k∗, such that limk→k∗ H(k) >
limk→k∗ G(k) holds if k approaches k∗ from the right. At k = k∗∗,H(k∗∗) = 0 holds. If G(k∗∗) < 0
holds, then there may be two steady state equilibria with (k,b)   0, as depicted in Figure 3a.
If G(k∗∗) > 0 holds, then there exists at least one steady state equilibrium with (k,b)   0,
according to the Intermediate Value Theorem (see Fig. 3b). If G(k∗∗) = 0 holds, G(·) and H(·)
cross at (k,b)=( k∗∗,0) (see Figs. 3c and 3d). In addition, if G (k∗∗) <H  (k∗∗), then G(·) and
H(·) intersect in the interval (k∗,k ∗∗) (see Fig. 3c). Q.E.D.
The result in Proposition 1 indicates that the inequality G(k∗∗)   0 plays an important
role in determining the number of the steady state equilibria with b ≥ 0. If G(k∗∗) < 0, the
economy may obtain two steady state equilibria with (k,b)   0 (see Fig. 3a). One equilibrium
is characterized by a lower k and a higher b, and the other is characterized by a higher k and a
lower b. On the other hand, if G(k∗∗) > 0, there may be a unique steady state equilibrium with
(k,b)   0 (see Fig. 3b). If G(k∗∗)=0 , there is a steady state equilibrium with a zero level of
public debt, b = 0 (see Figs. 3c and 3d). Moreover, there is also a steady state equilibrium with
(k,b)   0i fG (k∗∗) <H  (k∗∗) (see Fig. 3c), although there may be no steady state equilibrium
with (k,b)   0i fG (k∗∗) >H  (k∗∗) (see Fig. 3d).
The steady state equilibrium with a nonnegative stock of public debt, b ≥ 0, implies that the
government runs a deﬁcit or balances its budget. At the steady state with b>0, the amount of
social security payments is greater than that of the social security tax revenue: pτl/(1 + n) >
12τww(k). The tax revenue shortage is solved by issuing public debt. On the other hand, at the
steady state with b = 0, the revenue and the payments are balanced in each period.
The steady state with b ≥ 0 is dynamically ineﬃcient. This ineﬃciency arises from the fact
that k∗ <k ∗∗, which indicates a low τw and high p and τl. The interpretation of these three
factors is as follows. First, a lower rate of social security tax induces agents to save more. This
positive income eﬀect leads to overaccumulation of capital. Second, the expectation of greater
longevity induces agents to save more in preparation for their consumption in old age, which
also leads to an overaccumulation of capital. Finally, a higher amount of social security beneﬁt
implies the impossibility that the government cannot fully ﬁnance the social security payment by
social security tax. The government funds a part of this payment by issuing public debt so that
(1 + n)b>R (k)b holds, i.e., n + δ>f  (k). Therefore, the overaccumulation of capital appears
to be in equilibrium.
Although Proposition 1 focuses on the steady state equilibrium with b ≥ 0, there could be
an equilibrium with a negative stock of public debt, b<0: in this case, the government buys
bonds rather than sells them. In particular, there may be two equilibria with b<0: the one is
characterized by k<k ∗(see Figs. 3a - 3d) and the other is characterized by k>k ∗∗ (see Figs. 3b
and 3d). The former equilibrium implies dynamic eﬃciency and an excess tax revenue, while the
latter equilibrium implies dynamic ineﬃciency and a tax revenue shortage. Therefore, if there is
a steady state with k<k ∗ and b<0, the aim of achieving this equilibrium is desirable from the
viewpoint of eﬃciency. The government should buy bonds rather than sell them. On the other
hand, if there is no steady state with k<k ∗ and b<0, but rather a steady state with k>k ∗∗
and b<0, the government should not buy bonds. The equilibrium with k>k ∗∗ and b<0i s
Pareto inferior to any equilibrium with b ≥ 0. In this case, the government should sell bonds.
Case II: k∗ >k ∗∗
13This is the case where the economy has a lower p and τl and a higher τw. In this case, the
economy experiences lower longevity and a light social security burden. We will initially focus
on a steady state with b ≥ 0, and then consider a steady state with b<0.
Proposition 2:
(i) There may be two dynamically eﬃcient steady state equilibria with (k,b)   0, if G(k∗∗) < 0.
(ii) There is at least one dynamically eﬃcient steady state equilibrium with (k,b)   0, if
G(k∗∗) > 0.
(iii) There is a dynamically eﬃcient steady state equilibrium with (k,b)=( k∗∗,0), if G(k∗∗)=0 .
In addition, there is a dynamically eﬃcient steady state equilibrium with (k,b)   0, if
G (k∗∗) >H  (k∗∗).
Proof. As depicted in Figures 4a - 4d, H(·) ≥ 0 holds for k ∈ [k∗∗,k ∗). If there is a steady
state equilibrium with b ≥ 0, the capital stock for this equilibrium is in the interval [k∗∗,k ∗).
Therefore, the steady state with b ≥ 0, if it exists, is dynamically eﬃcient. By employing the
same argument as in the proof of Proposition 1, the existence of the steady state can be shown.
Q.E.D.
Shown in Figure 4 are the four types of steady states in Case II. The results of Case I and
Case II diﬀer as regards the following two points. First, in Case II, the steady state equilibrium
with b ≥ 0 is dynamically eﬃcient, although it is dynamically ineﬃcient in Case I. Second, in
Case II, the amount of tax revenue is greater than that of the social security payments in any
steady state with b ≥ 0, whereas in Case I, the revenue is less than the total payments in any
steady state with b ≥ 0.
In Case II, there is the possibility of a steady state equilibria with b<0. In particular, there
may be two equilibria with b<0, namely, one with k<k ∗∗ and another with k>k ∗ (see Figs.
144a - 4d). The former equilibrium implies dynamic eﬃciency and a tax revenue shortage, while
the latter implies dynamic ineﬃciency and an excessive tax revenue. If the former equilibrium
does not exist, then the remaining equilibrium with b<0 is dynamically ineﬃcient. In such a
situation, the aim of achieving a steady state with b<0 is not desirable, from the perspective
of dynamic eﬃciency. Since any equilibrium with b>0 is dynamically eﬃcient, the government
should sell bonds in the capital market.
Case III: k∗ = k∗∗
There is no steady state equilibrium with b ≥ 0, since H<0 ∀k>0, whereas steady states
may exist with b<0. If the steady state is characterized by k<(>)k∗ = k∗∗, then the economy
is dynamically eﬃcient (ineﬃcient).
The results in this subsection can be summarized as follows: in Case I (k∗ <k ∗∗), where
longevity is high and the social security burden is heavy, the steady state equilibrium with b ≥ 0
indicates dynamic ineﬃciency, and implies a tax revenue shortage (if b>0) or a balanced budget
(if b =0 ) . In Case II (k∗ >k ∗∗), where longevity is low and the social security burden is light,
the steady state equilibrium with b ≥ 0 indicates dynamic eﬃciency and an excess tax revenue
(if b>0) or balanced budget (if b =0 ) . Thus, there is a loss of eﬃciency when the government
sells bonds in Case I, but there is no such loss in Case II. Moreover, in both cases, there may
be either a dynamically eﬃcient or an ineﬃcient steady state equilibrium with b<0. If there is
a dynamically eﬃcient equilibrium with b<0, the government should buy bonds in the capital
market, in order to achieve eﬃciency.
As argued in the Introduction, Japan now faces problems associated with an aging popula-
tion and a heavy social security payment burden. Moreover, the social security program and the
government budget deﬁcit are closely related to each other in Japan. The analysis outlined in
this paper demonstrates that, in such situations, the economy may attain dynamically ineﬃcient
15steady state with b ≥ 0, as shown in Figure 3. Therefore, the next section undertakes a compar-
ative static analysis focusing on the dynamically ineﬃcient steady state equilibria with b ≥ 0,
and examines the eﬀects of policy reform and population aging in such equilibria. As regards the
preparation of the analysis in the next section, the following subsection examines the stability
of the steady states with b ≥ 0 in Case I.
4.3 Stability of the Steady State Equilibrium
This subsection aims to examine the stability of the dynamically ineﬃcient equilibria with b ≥ 0
in Case I. That is, it considers whether the competitive equilibrium converges to a steady state,
and to which of the steady states the economy converges if there are multiple steady state
equilibria. It is assumed that the number of steady state equilibria with (k,b)   0 is two (one)
if G(k∗∗) < (>)0.
Proposition 3: Consider Case I: k∗ <k ∗∗.
(i)Suppose that G(k∗∗) > 0 holds and that there is at most one steady state equilibrium with
(k,b)   0. The steady state equilibrium is then a saddle.
(ii)Suppose that G(k∗∗) < 0 holds and that there are two steady state equilibria with k>0
and b ≥ 0,e 1 and e2, where e1 (e2)has a lower (higher) k and a higher (lower) b. Then, e1 is a
saddle and e2 is a sink.
Proof: See Appendix A.
Proposition 3 shows the stability of each steady state equilibrium with b ≥ 0 in Case I. If
G(k∗∗) > 0 holds, the equilibrium is a saddle. If G(k∗∗) < 0 holds, the steady state equilibrium
with a low k (e1 equilibrium) represents a saddle equilibrium and the equilibrium with a high k (e2
equilibrium) is considered as a sink. There is the possibility that two economies with very similar
initial capital stocks will converge to very diﬀerent steady state equilibria. The e1 equilibrium is
16relatively eﬃcient to the e2 equilibrium, but the economy would converge to the e2 equilibrium
under most initial conditions, since e1 is a saddle, whereas e2 is a sink. Therefore, the initial
values of capital and public debt play crucial roles in determining the long-run consequences for
the economy.
5 Comparative Statics
This section focuses on the dynamically ineﬃcient steady state equilibrium with b ≥ 0 described
in Case I. The reason for this focus is as follows. In Case I, the steady state equilibrium with
b ≥ 0 is dynamically ineﬃcient, and thus there is a need for reducing ineﬃciency by implementing
some kind of policy reform. Moreover, as argued in the Introduction, Japan is now faced with an
aging population and a heavy social security payment burden. Such a situation is characterized
by the equilibrium with b ≥ 0, depicted in Case I. This section examines the eﬀects of changes
in economic policy or economic environment, and presents policy implications for Japan as well
as for countries that are running budget deﬁcits against a background of heavy social security
payment burdens caused by an aging population.
5.1 Eﬀects of Policy Reform
This subsection considers the eﬀects of changes in τl,τw, and γ on capital accumulation.
Proposition 4:
(i) ∂k/∂τl > (<)0 holds at an equilibrium of e1(e2).
(ii) ∂k/∂τw < (>)0 holds at an equilibrium of e1(e2).
(iii) When τl =0 ,∂ k / ∂ γ>(<)0 holds at an equilibrium of e1(e2). When τl > 0, a higher γ
leads to either a higher or lower level of capital.
17Proof: See Appendix B.
An increase in τl aﬀects capital in the following two ways. A higher τl leads to less savings,
thereby diminishing capital accumulation. Moreover, a higher τl requires a higher level of public
debt in order to ﬁnance social security payments, which reduces capital. These factors imply
a negative eﬀect of τl. On the other hand, a lower level of capital caused by a higher τl yields
a higher rate of interest that implies lower social security beneﬁts are evaluated for the youth
(τl/R). Young agents are likely to increase their savings in response to the lower discounted
present value of the beneﬁts. This positive direction of τl as regard savings enhances the accu-
mulation of capital. At e1(e2) equilibrium, the negative eﬀect is less (greater) than the positive
eﬀect. This result diﬀers from that proposed by Gertler (1997), who demonstrated that social
security beneﬁts unambiguously reduce capital. The result in opposition to that of Gertler (1997)
occurs at an equilibrium of e1.
An increase in τw aﬀects capital in the following two ways. First, a higher τw has a negative
income eﬀect, which decreases capital. This represents a negative eﬀect of τw on capital. Second,
a higher τw leads to a larger amount of revenue from social security tax. This condition decreases
the stock of public debt, which weakens the crowding-out eﬀect of public debt on capital. This
is a positive eﬀect of τw on capital. At e1(e2) equilibrium, the negative eﬀect is greater (less)
than the positive eﬀect. This result diﬀers from that of Pecchenino and Pollard (1997), who
demonstrated that social security tax reduces capital. The opposite result was obtained by the
present analysis at an equilibrium of e2.10
An increase in γ (i.e., a higher annuitization rate) aﬀects capital in the following two ways.
First, a higher γ leads to a lower level of bequests, thereby decreasing savings and capital. This
10 Pecchenino and Pollard (1997) assumed a production function with external eﬀects of capital and then
analyzed the eﬀects of policy reform on growth rate. However, if we adopt the neoclassical production function
in their analysis, we can replace “growth rate” with “a level of capital” in their comparative statics analysis.
18negative income eﬀect on capital yields a smaller amount of revenue from social security tax,
which requires a higher level of public debt to ﬁnance social security payments and thus crowds
out capital. These results imply a negative eﬀect of γ on capital. Second, a higher γ leads to a
lower discounted present value of social security beneﬁts (τl/R). This implies a positive income
eﬀect on savings and capital. Moreover, a higher γ requires a lower stock of public debt in a
capital market, which diminishes the crowding-out eﬀect of debt on capital. These results imply
a positive eﬀect of γ on capital. When τl > 0, the eﬀect of γ is ambiguous. However, when
τl =0 , the positive eﬀect is greater (less) than the negative eﬀect at an equilibrium of e1(e2).
The results in Proposition 4 indicate that the consequences of policy reform depend on
whether the economy is at an equilibrium of e1 or e2. When the economy experiences an equi-
librium of e1(e2), the policy maker should decrease (increase) social security beneﬁts per capita,
increase (decrease) social security tax, and decrease (increase) the annuitization rate in order to
improve the dynamic ineﬃciency of the equilibrium.
The combination of an increase in γ and a decrease in τl implies a shift from a pay-as-you-go
scheme to an actuarially fair pension scheme. When the economy does not implement a pay-
as-you-go pension scheme (τl = 0), raising the annuitization rate is harmful (beneﬁcial) to the
economy at an equilibrium of e1(e2). However, when the economy maintains the combination
of the two pension schemes (τl > 0 and γ>0), then the eﬀect of annuitization is ambiguous.
We can only conclude that a decrease in social security beneﬁts (τl) is beneﬁcial (harmful) to
the economy at an equilibrium of e1(e2). The social security reform aiming at an actuarially fair
annuity is not necessarily beneﬁcial from the viewpoint of dynamic eﬃciency.
195.2 Eﬀects of Population Aging
This subsection considers eﬀects of population growth (n) and longevity (p) on capital accumu-
lation.
Proposition 5:
(i) A higher n leads to either a higher or lower level of capital.
(ii) When γ =1and τw(1 + p)(2 + p)/p ≥ 1,∂ k / ∂ p>(<)0 holds at an equilibrium of e1(e2).
When γ<1, a higher p leads to either a higher or lower level of capital.
Proof: See Appendix B.
A higher n leads to a lower k, given the other variables. This result implies a negative eﬀect on
capital. On the other hand, a higher n yields a lighter aggregate social security beneﬁt burden
and thus a lower level of public debt. This lessens the crowding-out eﬀect of public debt on
capital. We see in this scenario the two opposite eﬀects of population growth rate on capital.
Therefore, the eﬀect of aging caused by a lower rate of population growth remains generally
ambiguous.
A higher p aﬀects capital in the following two ways. First, a higher expectancy of longevity
induces agents to save more, which enhances capital accumulation. This represents a positive
eﬀect on capital. Second, a higher p reduces unintentional bequests. This negative income
eﬀect on savings decreases capital. Moreover, a higher p implies a larger amount of aggregate
social security beneﬁts. This scenario requires a larger amount of public debt, thereby reducing
the accumulation of capital. These results imply a negative eﬀect on capital. If γ = 1 and
τw(1 + p)(2 + p)/p ≥ 1, then the positive eﬀect is greater (less) than the negative eﬀect at an
equilibrium of e1(e2). The consequence of annuitization at an equilibrium of e2 is in opposition
to that described in Pecchenino and Pollard (1997).
206 An Alternative Form of Social Security Payments
Section 4 demonstrated that the economy experiences excessive saving (i.e., a dynamically inef-
ﬁcient steady state) when a social security program is ﬁnanced by the issuance of public debt
(Proposition 1). This result is in opposition to many previous ﬁndings that social security reduces
saving (see, for example, Pecchenino and Pollard (1997)). Readers may suspect that this discrep-
ancy between results may arise from the assumption of lump-sum beneﬁts. This section assumes
an alternative form of social security, in which payments are calculated as a replacement rate on
the next generation’s wages. Under this alternative form, it is shown that the economy reﬂects
excessive saving. Therefore, it could be argued that excessive saving is a probable consequence
when a social security program is ﬁnanced by public debt.
Suppose that the payments for the older individuals in generation t are calculated by a
replacement rate on the next generation’s wages: τl
t+1 = ζwt+1, where ζ>0 is a constant
parameter.11 An agent who pays a social security tax, τwwt, in youth will receive the social
security payment, ζwt+1, upon reaching old age. Then, by replacing τl with ζwt, the government
budget constraint is rewritten as Bt+1 + Ntτwwt = RtBt + pNt−1ζwt. Dividing both sides by Nt
and rearranging the equation, the budget equation in equilibrium is








The inequality pζ/(1 + n) >τ w implies that social security payments are greater than the total
tax revenue.12
11 The qualitative results regarding the eﬃciency and the number of steady state equilibria do not change if we
assume that payments are calculated by a replacement rate of the next generation’s wage income tax, ζτwwt+1.
12 The inequality pζ/(1 + n) >τ w implies that the economy has higher expected longevity, a higher rate of
replacement, a lower rate of population growth, and a lower rate of social security tax.
21The capital market clearing condition (12) is rewritten as




















by replacing τl with ζwt+1. Thus, (14) and (15) constitute a planar system of (k,b) when the
social security payment is calculated as a replacement rate on wages.
We proceed with the equilibrium analysis by using a phase diagram. The phase diagram for
(15) is
kt+1   kt ⇔ bt   ˜ G(kt) ≡
p











1+n − τw 












and the phase diagram for (14) is
bt+1   bt ⇔ bt ≷ ˜ H(kt) ≡ (
pζ
1+n−τw)w(kt)
1+n−R(kt) if kt ≶ k∗. (16)
(16) implies that the value of b depends on the two following inequalities: pζ/(1 + n) ≷ τw and
kt ≶ k∗.13 Focusing on the inequality pζ/(1+ n) ≷ τw, the types of equilibria are classiﬁed into
the following three categories.
(i) pζ/(1 + n) >τ w (Fig. 5a). This is the case involving excessive social security payment
burden. As depicted in Fig. 5a, there may be two dynamically ineﬃcient steady state equilibria
with (k,b)   0, and one dynamically eﬃcient equilibrium with k>0 and b<0. This result
corresponds the results of Proposition 1 (i), which characterizes dynamically ineﬃcient multiple
steady state equilibria with (k,b)   0, where payments are greater than the tax revenue.
13 When the payments are calculated at a constant level, there is a critical value k∗∗ (see Eq. (13)). On the
other hand, when the payments are calculated as a replacement rate on wages, this critical value disappears.
22(ii) pζ/(1+n) >τ w (Fig. 5b). In this case, the tax revenue is suﬃcient to cover social security
payments. There may be one dynamically eﬃcient steady state equilibrium with (k,b)   0 and
one dynamically ineﬃcient steady state equilibrium with k>0 and b<0. This result corresponds
to that demonstrated in Proposition 2 (ii).
(iii) pζ/(1 + n)=τw . In this case, the tax revenue is equal to the amount of the social
security payments. Although the government can borrow (lend) resources from (to) individuals
through the capital market, there is no public debt issue in the possible steady states. The
capital market clearing condition is reduced to the following equation:




















The steady state equilibrium, if it exists, is not necessarily unique (see Galor and Ryder
(1989)). Moreover, its eﬃciency depends on the parameter values. In order to investigate the
dynamic eﬃciency of the steady state equilibrium in case (iii), let us specify the production
function as f(k)=kα, α ∈ (0,1). Then, the golden rule level of capital and the competitive























It is easily shown that k∗ >kholds if n = δ =0 , and that k∗ <kholds if (α,p,ζ,τw,δ,γ,n)=
(1/4,9/10,1/10,1/10,1,0,0).
The result in this section implies that excessive saving (i.e., a dynamically ineﬃcient equi-
librium) could appear to be an equilibrium regardless of the form of social security payment.
Excessive saving is a probable consequence when a social security program is ﬁnanced by public
debt.
237 Concluding Remarks
This study examined social security payments ﬁnanced by public debt in an overlapping genera-
tions model of growth and aging. It was found that (i) dynamically ineﬃcient, multiple equilibria
may exist when a social security program is ﬁnanced by issuing public debt; and (ii) eﬀects of
pension reform and population aging depend heavily on the state of the equilibrium.
The results of this paper have policy implications for an economy with aging and deﬁcits in
the following two areas. First, when there is a tax revenue shortage, ﬁnancing social security
payments by issuing public debt may yield a dynamically ineﬃcient equilibrium (see the results
in Proposition 1 and case (i) in Section 6). With this scenario, there could also be a dynamically
eﬃcient equilibrium with a negative stock of public debt. Hence, the government should aim
to achieve this eﬃcient equilibrium by buying bonds to attain eﬃciency. Second, when the
economy eventually falls into a dynamically ineﬃcient equilibrium, in which the government sells
bonds, there will be a need for policy reform. However, if there are two steady state equilibria
(Proposition 1(ii) and (iii)), the eﬀects of policy reform are entirely diﬀerent between the two
cases (see Proposition 4). For example, reforming social security from a pay-as-you-go scheme
to an actuarially fair pension scheme in preparation for population aging would be desirable for
the one equilibrium but would be undesirable for the other equilibrium. Policy-makers therefore
need to exercise caution when implementing social security policy reform.
In closing, a further direction for the present analysis should be noted. One natural direction
for such studies would be to extend the present model by including the extended family system
and endogenous fertility as factors. This extension has been suggested by Cigno and Rosati (1996,
1997), who examined several models that captured the eﬀects of social security on household
saving behaviors; they demonstrated that a model including both the extended family system
24and endogenous fertility provided a good ﬁt with the empirical results. Thus, extending the
present model to one reﬂecting their suggestions would lead to further fruitful results as regards
the analysis of social security and household saving.
25Appendix A: Proof of Proposition 3
We ﬁrst derive the Jacobian matrix at any steady state (k,b) of a planar system under the














































Note that η4 ∈ (0,1) holds, since R(k) < 1+n at a steady state with k ∈ (k∗,k ∗∗).










For any (k,b)   0, its trace and determinant are
trJ = η1 + η4 > 0,
detJ = η1η4 − η2η3
=
pR(k)
(1 + p)ξ(k;n,p,γ,τl)(1 + n)
[w
 (k){(1 − τ
w)+( 1− γ)(1 − p)} +( 1− γ)(1 − p){R
 (k)k + R(k)}]
> 0; R
 (k)k + R(k) > 0 holds by Assumption 1 (ii).
26Moreover, it holds that
∆=( trJ)
2 − 4detJ =( η1 + η4)
2 − 4(η1η4 − η2η3)=( η1 − η4)
2 +4 η2η3 > 0,
which implies that J has two positive eigenvalues at each steady state.
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2 − trJλ + detJ =0 .
We immediately obtain
p(−1) = 1 + trJ + detJ>0,
since trJ > 0 and detJ>0 hold. Hence, the only remaining task is to conﬁrm the sign of p(1).
At an e1 equilibrium, it holds that G (k) >H  (k) (see Fig. 3a). With (17) and 1 − η4 > 0,
this inequality is rewritten as:
1 − (η1 + η4)+( η1η4 − η2η3) < 0, i.e., p(1) < 0. (18)
Thus, p(−1) > 0 and p(1) < 0 imply that e1 equilibrium is a saddle type of equilibrium.
At an e2 equilibrium, it holds that G (k) <H  (k); in other words,
1 − (η1 + η4)+( η1η4 − η2η3) > 0, i.e., p(1) > 0. (19)
Since H (k) < 0 holds at an e2 equilibrium, it also holds that G (k)=( 1− η1)/η2 < 0, which
implies that η1 ∈ (0,1). Furthermore, it holds that η4 = R(k)/(1+n) ∈ (0,1). These results lead
to the conclusion that trJ = η1 + η4 ∈ (0,2). Therefore, both eigenvalues are within the range
(−1,1) and the equilibrium is a sink. Q.E.D.
Appendix B: Proof of Propositions 4 and 5
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The sign of φ(k;n,p,γ,τl) remains ambiguous.
Since our focus is on the dynamically ineﬃcient equilibrium, (18) and (19) hold. The deter-
minant of the matrix on the left-hand side, |D|, is:





< 0a t e1 equilibrium; from (18);
> 0a t e2 equilibrium; from (19).
Also, 1−η4 =1−R(k)/(1+n) > 0 holds in the dynamically ineﬃcient steady state equilibrium.









































28The sign of the value in the square brackets is negative. Thus, we obtain
∂k/∂τ
l ≷ 0 if and only if |D| = p(1) ≶ 0.
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The sign of the value in the square brackets is positive. Thus, we obtain
∂k/∂τ
w ≷ 0 if and only if |D| = p(1) ≷ 0.







































The ﬁrst term in the square brackets, τl
pR(k)(1+γ(1−p)/p)2, is positive, whereas the second term,
−pR(k)(k +b), is negative. Thus, the sign of ∂k/∂γ remains ambiguous. However, if τl =0 , the
ﬁrst term disappears. Thus, we obtain
∂k/∂γ ≶ 0 if and only if |D| = p(1) ≷ 0
under the assumption that τl =0 .








   
 
 

















   
 
 
















The sign of the ﬁrst term in the square brackets is ambiguous, whereas the sign of the second
term is positive. Thus, the sign of ∂k/∂n remains ambiguous.


































Suppose that γ<1. The sign of φ(k;n,p,γ,τl)(1 − η4) is ambiguous, while the sign of
η2τl/(1 + n)2 is negative. Thus, the sign of ∂k/∂p remains ambiguous.
Next, suppose that γ =1 . In order to derive the condition that will be suﬃcient for deter-
mining the sign of φ, we will consider the sign of ξ · φ.










































At the dynamically ineﬃcient equilibrium, the government budget constraint leads to:








ww(k) > 0. (22)
Substituting
pτl



































The sign of the value in the square brackets is non-positive if τw(1 + p)(2 + p)/p ≥ 1. Since
ξ>0, the ﬁrst term in the square brackets of (20) is negative if γ = 1 and τw(1+p)(2+p)/p ≥ 1,
and the second term is negative. Thus, we obtain
∂k/∂p ≷ 0 if and only if |D| = p(1) ≶ 0
under the assumption γ = 1 and τw(1 + p)(2 + p)/p ≥ 1. Q.E.D.
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